Police Crackdown on a Cannabis Market – The Case of Christiania in Copenhagen

A recent change in Danish cannabis control policy has had significant implications for the structure of the retail-level cannabis market in Copenhagen. The formal change in policy consists of a law imposed in 2004, which up-penalizes possession for personal use. The law was immediately followed by an extensive police crackdown in an area in Copenhagen, known as Christiania, which has had an infamous and notoriously open cannabis retail-market since the mid-1970’s.

Danish cannabis policy and the case of Christiania

Since the first drug laws addressing cannabis were passed in 1965 Denmark has followed a policy best described as passive criminalisation. Possession and sale of cannabis is illegal but the police have been authoritatively[1] instructed to focus on kingpins and hard drugs. This drug police prioritisation strategy, has allowed a cannabis market in Christiania to operate with few interruptions for 32 years.

The market itself is best explained as primarily a retail-market functioning as an integration of a “local” and an “export”[2] market.

Its local market characteristics are derived from the special circumstances around the area of Christiania that have made the market an accepted and integral part of the local community. It has even on occasion been physically defended from police enforcement, leaving the area as a blind spot with no regular police patrolling. In extension of the local market characteristics, a set of explicit “conduct norms”[3] prohibiting hard drugs and sale of cannabis to minors evolved.

The area also became famous as a tourist attraction and an export cannabis market, which resulted in a very visible, quite organised and decidedly profitable market. It’s prosperity flourished from the amount of “intangible criminal capital” [4]that such a unique setting supported, allowing for smooth business operations and low externalities.

In 2003, police estimated that about two-thirds of the total retail-sale of cannabis in Copenhagen took place in Christiania, and was valued at about 85 million euros annually. On any given day it is estimated that no less than 20 kilos [5] were sold. This sale was primarily retail, although it’s widely acknowledged that the area served as a transit distribution central with ties to the rest of Scandinavia. Denmark’s geographic location as a southern border to the rest of Europe was also instrumental[6].

The flagrancy of the situation was exemplified by one of the dealing booths openly having a side business as a clothing manufacturer that went as far as briefly advertising for their cannabis products on a local television channel. The damage to public and police morale from this systematically unpunished crime was becoming too offensive and the hitherto begrudging acceptance from politicians was wearing thin.

Window of Opportunity

In 2001 a new government with a tough on crime agenda was elected. Two years later they announced their intent to close down the market in Christiania as part of an action plan dubbed, “The Fight Against Drugs, 2003. This crackdown conversely tied in with an ongoing effort to close down coffee shops illegally selling cannabis around Copenhagen and a so-called “normalisation”[7] of the Christiania area.

In 2004, a law[8] was passed to specifically address the problem of retail cannabis dealing. It introduced two significant changes in regard to daily law enforcement practices. First, it increased the penalty for the possession of cannabis for personal use[9], from a discriminatory warning to an obligatory fine of 70 euros; and, secondly it installed harsher punishments for the sale of cannabis.

It is explicitly stated in the law that the expected the cost of enacting the changes would be equivalent to five prison cells annually.

Moreover the crackdown’s demand for increased penalty action for possession violations lead to the infusion of police measures not previously permitted, such as body searches and restrictions in movement in specific geographical areas. Also, it follows from the Administration of Justice Act, that more severe penalties for dealing allow the police to confiscate money suspected of coming from sale of drugs. This ties in with law nr. 436 against organised crime[10] of 2003 that introduces reversed burden of proof in cases of serious drug crimes.

Police Intervention

The crackdown on the retail cannabis markets is officially ranked as a top three priority of the Copenhagen police force, alongside anti-terrorist security measures and problems with disenfranchised youth. The main objective was to disrupt the market through the incapacitation of dealers, followed by targeting of users in an attempt to increase the “full price”[11] of buying cannabis sufficiently that inexperienced users would be deterred altogether.

The initial crackdown was named Phase-1, and carried out by specially trained police officers in full riot gear on April 16, 2004. On the first day of Phase-1, approximately 37 makeshift dealing-booths were torn down and 60 dealers and their helpers were arrested along with 20 people accused of forming an organised lookout corps[12].

Prior to the crackdown, police had surveillance of the booths and specific dealers for three quarters of a year, which formed the basis to estimate the total amount of cannabis sold daily at about 20 kilos. All in all, 33 people wound up with prison sentences averaging 15 months. The longest sentence for a dealer was two and a half years and the lookouts received sentences of a year and a half to two and a half years incarceration, 34 years in total. The relative severity of the sentences for the lookout corps was due to the organised nature of their work. The lookouts received a weekly payment somewhere between 350 and 900 euros, depending on their organisational responsibilities, but independent of the actual amount being sold. In total, 75 years of prison was metered out and “several millions”[13] “kroner”[14] in cash was confiscated. The following year police targeted buyers in the area by issuing 4834 fines for possession a total of 471 kilos[15].

Currently the strategy is to have a police presence in the area to enforce a zero tolerance zone and maintain public order and peace. Even though the police are reluctant to estimate the amount of man-hours required for this effort, they reported having 20-30 officers on duty daily in 2005.

Effects and market reactions

Generally speaking, the retail-market for cannabis in Copenhagen essentially consists of two sets of sactors representing two types of markets: Christiania being a local export market with ties to outlaw biker gangs and the remaining various markets around Copenhagen by and large being “public”[16] and provided for by ethnic minority gangs.

The following analysis of effects and market reactions is based on assumptions about the “economic logic of drug markets”[17] and their “temporal dynamics”[18].

Replacement, dispersion and adaptation

The most significant immediate effect of the Phase-1 crackdown is the successful reduction of the throughput capacity and the replacement of dealers. Police estimate the current level of transactions at 10 to 20 percent of that prior to the crackdown and riot gear is no longer necessary for police patrolling the area of Christiania.

Police report a 25% percent price increase[19] in Christiania, while social workers in the greater Copenhagen area report of prices equivalent to those prior to the crackdown. Consequently, social workers and police report of new marketing methods involving the sale of drugs now taking place from taxis and in the vicinity of schools, sometimes with assistance from minors[20].

The current profit rates, per dealer, can be assumed to be lower, but wider circles of actors are involved yielding higher visibility in many parts of Copenhagen. These new actors are widely recruited among disenfranchised[21] young second generation immigrants and their methods of selling do not adhere to any conduct norms in regards to keeping cannabis separate from other drugs[22].

Thus the stated objective of making it harder for new users to buy cannabis has, unfortunately, been circumvented by the introduction and widely applied new dealing methods used by these new retail-dealers outside of Christiania.

Systemic violence

As most other places, the cannabis market in Copenhagen has not been known for its associated systemic violence[23]. While there is no reason to doubt that some extent of internal systemic violence occurred during the establishment and maintenance of the hierarchy involved in allocating the rights to sell from the most profitably placed dealing booths, it is hitherto unheard of for it to spill over and endanger the general public.

As early as 2003, police warned politicians and the public that a struggle between two groups of actors over the cannabis market in Copenhagen was impending[24]. Tragically, this struggle broke out in the aftermath of the crackdown. Since then there have been several examples of turf wars and other violent altercations associated with access to the lucrative retail market.

In 2005, there were two registered episodes of shootings with automatic weapons within two days in Christiania, with one person killed and another five bystanders injured from machine gun fire. Shortly thereafter, there was an episode of a brutal beating and subsequent death of a teenager trying to sell cannabis in the area.

Outside of Christiania there has been at least six episodes in the first year and a half following the crackdown involving automatic weapons that the police have stated were struggles for market shares in the cannabis market[25]. This is consistent with the theory that enforcement in one geographical area will lead to violence in another area[26].

On a more general level it should be noted that incidents of automatic weapons being fired on the streets of Copenhagen is still considered an extremely rare occurrence.

Indirect Costs

Returning to the initial claim put forth in the law from 2004, that the implementation can be handled within the regular police budgets, it is beneficial to look at recent local crime statistics from a “criminal justice commons”[27] perspective.

Crime rates

The local police station with jurisdictional responsibility for the area of Christiania has registered a 316% increase in solved crimes between 2004 and 2005 and a 28-fold increase from the level in 2003. This reflects the focus on enforcing possession violations in Christiania. This focus is not cost neutral, seeing as how the remaining nine areas sorting under that police station have seen significant reductions in the amount of solved crimes across the board[28].

Specifically, cases against minors in the area have been a marked by an increase in petty drug crimes, as well as more charges of violence and weapons infractions. In the category of less serious crimes the increase has been 116% between 2004 and 2005 with a simultaneous reduction of 18% in the number of charges for serious crimes, such as robberies, burglaries and car theft[29].

It will be interesting to follow if this decreased deterrence regarding property crimes will result in an increase in property crime rates in the longer run; and, if so, develop a “virtuous cycle”[30].

Deterrence and social costs

With the police’s focus on enforcing possession violations as a means of deterrence from getting a criminal record, it is important to evaluate the total level of penalisation[31]. In Denmark, issues about criminal records have received a lot of attention in recent years. While there have been no formal scientific analysis of these issues, the number of requests to police for personal criminal records have increased steeply in the last ten years[32]. This reflects the widespread focus from employers on hiring people without criminal records.

The deterrent impact of the recent law changes is hard to evaluate independently. Is the marginal deterrent effect of a small fine significantly bigger than that of a formal warning? The police seem to think that it is not, since, they have actively been lobbying politicians for a new level of fines at about 250 euros, compared to 70 euros presently. Especially the fines to dealers are described as ridiculously small and are reportedly “laughed off”[33].

The ability of policing to reduce drug crime

Questioning the long-term ability of policing to reduce drug crime was not explicitly addressed in the law making process beyond the assumption that a crackdown would diminish the visibility and profitability of the existing market. An important issue that was not addressed at all was the timeframe in which the police effort has to be sustained to maintain the reduced throughput capacity. This lack of long-term planning has been an unpleasant reminder for police of a former attempt at disrupting the cannabis market in Christiania.

During 1989-1993 a crackdown on the retail-market was implemented and enforced at the police’s own initiative. Back then, the politicians abruptly stopped their support and called for an end to the crackdown, which resulted in the immediate resurgence of the market at its former capacity[34].

The present absence of political initiatives or even debate regarding the future of policing practices in the area has resulted in mistrust towards the governing bodies among key senior police officers, facing a very hostile and demanding work environment with riots on regular occasions.

During the course of the first two years, there have been 12 “big confrontations” resulting in 114 injured officers[35]. Duty in Christiania is reportedly the most unpopular of all tasks among police, seeing as their presence is contested daily. It has even been necessary to call in reinforcements from the surrounding police districts to maintain a sufficient presence in this hostile environment[36]. So far, 29 people have issued formal complaints against the police with the State Attorney alleging unjustified arrests and unnecessary use of force. For the political level not to address these problems in a context of constrained enforcement capacity is counter productive in regards to the ambition of curtailing illicit markets and minimizing the harm to the public.

Conclusion

The remaining problems concerning replacement, adaptation, dispersion and systemic violence ought to be addressed directly; and, a discussion focusing on a reasonable assessment of the necessary resources to uphold a sustained police presence ought to be a matter of public scrutiny.

If this is not done, it remains dubious that positive outcomes accomplished by the crackdown can be identified. It is quite plausible that elements of the retail-cannabis problem will have worsened seeing as how a new set of actors, more willing to use violence, have gained a foothold geographically, as well as, financially.

In the sense that “criminal violence feeds on itself”[37] it can be expected that the situation will get worse before it gets any better.

References

• Andersen, Mette (2006): ”Hvad sker der på Christiania?”, Dansk Politi, 22.02.2006.
• Det Europæiske Overvågningscenter for Narkotika og Narkotikamisbrug (EMCDDA) (2006): Årsberetning.
• Kilmer, Beau (2002): “Do Cannabis Possession Laws Influence Cannabis Use?” In I. Spruit (Ed.), Cannabis 2002 report: Technical report of the International Scientific Conference (119-141). Brussels, Ministry of Public Health of Belgium.
• Kleiman, Mark A.R. (1989): Marijuana – Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control, Greenwood Press, New York.
• Kleiman, Mark A.R. (1992): Against Excess – Drug Policy for Results, Basic Books, New York.
• Kleiman, Mark A.R. (1997): “The Problem of Replacement and the Logic of Drug Law Enforcement”, The FAS Drug Policy Analysis Bulletin, #3
• La Cour, Eichard og Hansen, Benny Ernst (2004): ”Vi er ikke enige I Christiania-artikel”, Dansk Politi, 17.11.2004.
• Larsen, Ole Martin (2006): ”Pusherstreet over hele byen”, Rus og afhængighed, Nr. 1, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
• Laursen, Lau (1996): ”Scandinavia’s tug of war on drugs”, in Hakkarainen, Laursen & Tigerstedt (Eds.), Discussing Drugs and Control Policy – Comparative Studies on Four Nordic Countries, NAD Publication 31, Helsinki.
• MacCoun, Robert and Reuter, Peter (1997): Interpreting Dutch Cannabis Policy - Reasoning by Analogy in the Legalization Debate, Science, New Series, Vol.278, No.5335, pp.47-52.
• MacCoun, Kilmer and Reuter (2003): Research on Drugs-Crime Linkages: The Next Generation, National Institute of Justice Special Report.
• Møller, Kim (2006): ”Hvad sker der med hash-markedet?”, Stof, nr.7, pp.14-18.
• Rasmussen, David W. and Benson, Bruce L.(1994): The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War – Criminal Justice in the Commons, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. London
• Regeringen (2003): Kampen mod narko – handlingsplan mod narkotikamisbrug.
• Scharling, Nicolai (2004): ”Christiania: Modstander med medietække”, Dansk Politi, 28.01.2004.
• Steinberg, James B.; Lyon, David W. and Vaiana, Mary E. (Eds.) (1992): Urban America – Policy Choices for Los Angeles and the Nation, RAND, Santa Monica.
• Winsløw, Jacob Hilden (1985): ”Kriminaliseringens sociale konsekvenser”, Narkotika og kontrolpolitik, Seminar arrangeret af Nordisk Råd i samarbejde med Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi, Rønne, 22.-24.april 1985, Minab/Gotab, Stockholm, p.83.

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