U.S. Aid to Colombia: Strategic Limitations

WRH: What are the aims of the proposed U.S. aid package to Colombia?

EN: What U.S. decisionmakers are hoping is that if we throw enough money and military assistance at Colombia, somehow Pastrana will get on top of the situation. They realize that they are looking at a very serious situation in Colombia, as economic and political problems continue to worsen. Let's face it: this is the closest analogy to the Vietnam situation we've seen in thirty years-a nation of almost 40 million people, highly challenging terrain, a decades-old guerrilla insurgency that represents, at least in part, very real socioeconomic grievances on the part of an impoverished population. There's unlikely to be much support in the United States for sending troops to fight and die there. So the current rhetoric and strategy focus on the drug aspects of the threat, and the aid package is justified primarily on those grounds. And like with Vietnam, those who argue that most of the aid should be for economic assistance rather than military hardware generally are outvoted by those with a knee-jerk preference for military assistance and military solutions.

WRH: What is the long-term sustainability of the current U.S. approach to reducing Colombian drug flow?

EN: It’s worth considering that both nations are now paying the price of Washington’s hostile strategy toward the former president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper. The U.S. government was more hostile toward his government than almost any other in the world, even those that posed far greater threats to U.S. national security or were more deeply involved in criminal activities. Our policy failed to drive Samper from office, but it probably did succeed in simultaneously undermining his efforts to control the guerrilla threat and empowering the right-wing paramilitary organizations.

The central flaw in the U.S. government’s strategy is the faulty assumption that our anti-drug aims can be pursued in tandem with our anti-guerrilla aims. People are recognizing that the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and the paramilitaries are involved in the drug trade, and saying, ‘let’s pursue a strategy that goes after both of them simultaneously,’ or, 'let's go after the drugs because that will take away their money and then they can’t buy weapons.' But there is virtually no historical evidence from Colombia or anywhere else in the world indicating that it is possible to cut off illicit revenues generated by global commodities markets.

Take, as an example, our current efforts to eradicate coca and opium poppies in Colombia. Some people argue that an effective eradication campaign can weaken the guerrillas by depriving them of revenues. But many decades of pursuing eradication policies in Latin America suggest that well-organized groups, like FARC, will be the last to suffer from such efforts. Indeed, they may well benefit from the increase in prices that would likely follow reduced production. And FARC stand to benefit politically, as they have to date, by posing as the protector of the struggling campesino against U.S.-prompted eradication campaigns that deprive the farmers of their livelihoods.

WRH: What strategies might Pastrana pursue in order to maximize the much-needed U.S. support?

EN: Some have suggested that Pastrana pursue a Fujimori-type strategy-that is, put drug control efforts on the back burner and pursue a highly aggressive strategy toward the guerrillas. But the FARC are deeply embedded, their terrain doesn’t lend itself easily to counterinsurgency efforts, and Pastrana doesn't have the domestic support that Fujimori did. Fujimori could afford to ignore wishes of the U.S. government, at least temporarily, while he focused on destroying the Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path]. And even so, the "Fujimori strategy" may not have been so singularly responsible for the defeat of Sendero.

But even if Colombia's domestic politics favored such an approach-which they don’t seem to-powerful forces in the U.S. government would likely make it impossible. Pastrana is in a very difficult situation. The FARC's commitment to the peace process is questionable, and he's hemmed in by right-wing paramilitaries whose interest is equally slight. The military has not been effective, and many of its leaders apparently regard the paramilitaries as necessary to their efforts. Even if Pastrana were entirely committed to pursuing a peace process consistent with human rights, which he appears to be, it's not clear that he has the power to do so.

The real tragedy for Colombians is that they are bearing the brunt of a U.S. drug policy that makes just about no sense whatsoever. Despite rhetoric about "regional strategies" and Andean regional summits, U.S. leaders continue to measure success largely by decreases in drug production in individual countries. Peru was applauded last year for significantly reducing its coca output. This year, Bolivia is earning the praise. But the most heartfelt thanks are coming from the cocaleros in Colombia, grateful that their crops are now earning higher prices due to reduced competition from their neighbors.

The net output of coca from Latin America has remained roughly the same over the past few years, but the production is now concentrated in that part of the continent that least serves U.S. and regional strategic interests. There is an irreconcilable conflict between what Colombia needs to do to address its economic and political problems and what the U.S. government expects it to do with respect to drugs.

WRH: Are there elements within the U.S. government who would be receptive to pursuing a different approach from what we’ve tried in the past?

EN: No doubt there are people of influence in senior policy-making circles who understand the situation and would like to take a pragmatic approach-laying off the drug war and focusing on the peace process. They probably believe that the last thing the U.S. needs is a communist insurgency finally winning one in Latin America-or even fighting to a draw-after all these years. I suspect that [U.S. drug czar] Barry McCaffrey can to figure this out, as can others who don’t have to focus solely on the drug issue. But is there even the political and intellectual wiggle room to discuss this openly in a government where anyone who questions the basic drug war strategy is likely to be accused of treason? Congress is full of folk who don't know the slightest thing about drugs, drug policy, or Latin America, but who can demagogue the drug issue with the best of them. The result is a chilling effect on frank discussions about bona fide policy options that need to be considered openly and honestly.

So although Pastrana is making heroic efforts, it seems the best he can do right now is pray for bad weather in Brazil and good fortune for Starbuck’s. A boom in coffee prices would empower traditional and other elements in society with a strong interest in the peace process, provide legal work for poor farmers, and generally help remedy Colombia’s economic problems. It’s just a prayer, but I’m not sure what else he’s got.

Interview by Nora Connor, Research Associate

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) is a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit research and information organization which is dedicated to promoting social and economic justice and the formation of rational and constructive U.S. policies toward Latin America.