A Fundamentally Flawed Strategy: The U.S. "War on Drugs" in Bolivia

WOLA aims to foster thoughtful interchange about significant issues. Our briefing series on Issues in International Drug Policy includes papers from diverse perspectives. The opinions expressed in this brief, by Coletta Youngers, represent those of the Washington Office on Latin America.

Executive Summary

Over the last decade, U.S.-Bolivian relations have been dominated by drug diplomacy. U.S. support for antinarcotics programs in Bolivia has steadily increased - as have tensions over the nature of the "drug war" in Bolivia. The "militarization" of U.S. international drug policy, which was institutionalized under the "Andean Strategy" announced in September 1989, has strained diplomatic relations between the two countries and has generated significant controversy in Bolivia.

The Bolivian state is not seriously threatened at the present time by either guerrilla insurgencies or powerful drug traffickers, although both operate in the country. The country does, however, have a legacy of military rule and drug-related corruption within the armed forces, particularly the army. Given this history, the Bolivian government of President Jaime Paz Zamora has been reluctant to involve the army in antinarcotics operations, which has been a central goal of U.S. policy.

That goal was finally achieved last March, despite opposition from across the political spectrum, when the Bolivian government announced that U.S. Special Forces would begin training Bolivian army personnel. The negative consequences of that decision are already being felt. It has heightened anti-American feeling, to the point where last July Bolivian armed forces officials called for the expulsion of DEA agents allegedly involved in the arrest of a Bolivian navy lieutenant. Both the decision to bring in the army and the role of the United States in planning and overseeing counternarcotics operations have sparked widespread protests, which sometimes end in violence. As the Bolivian army is again thrust into domestic politics and internal order, greater violence is possible.

U.S. drug policy in Bolivia is fundamentally flawed. Although policymakers in Washington may think the potential gains outweigh the risks involved, there is no evidence to date that the policy will have its desired outcome: a reduction in cocaine available on U.S. streets. In fact, DEA officials reported a 28 percent increase in South American cocaine production in 1990. Even when antinarcotics efforts are successful in a particular locale, production simply spreads to other areas and countries. Known as the "balloon effect," this dispersion has already occurred in the Andes. As a result of the Colombian government's crack-down on the Medellin cartel, drug trafficking operations have expanded in other countries, including Bolivia. Hence, the threat that the traffickers pose to Bolivia has increased significantly since the Andean Strategy was initiated in 1989 - while cocaine production continues to go up. From a Bolivian point of view, the medicine prescribed by the U.S. government to combat drug trafficking may be worse than the disease.

Introduction

After a spirited debate culminating in Bolivia's opposition parties abandoning the floor of the Congress in protest, on April 4 of this year the ruling Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN) parties provided congressional approval for the entry of over 100 U.S. military troops to initiate training activities with the Bolivian army. The Bolivian government's approval of the training operation appeared to put the U.S. "Andean Initiative" back on track. It had been derailed for nearly a year as the implementation of "Annex III" - an agreement signed in May 1990 that lays out the military component of U.S. antinarcotics assistance - was delayed due to overwhelming public opposition to what is commonly referred to in Bolivia as the "militarization" of antinarcotics activities. It looked in April as if U.S. government officials had achieved their goal of assuring a prominent role for the Bolivian army in the fight against drug trafficking. (1)

Recent developments, however, have thrown new obstacles in the way of the U.S. antinarcotics strategy for Bolivia. Events surrounding the high profile raid on June 28, 1991 on the town of Santa Ana by Bolivian antinarcotics police supported by national Air Force and Navy troops and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents led high-ranking Bolivian armed forces officials to call for the expulsion of the DEA agents involved. Accusations that the operation was planned and controlled by U.S. personnel heightened anti-American (2) feeling and fueled the debate over the way in which the U.S. government has waged its war on drugs in Bolivia. The U.S. government adamantly denies these allegations, but the backlash from the Santa Ana raid vividly illustrates the fragile state of U.S. drug policy in Bolivia.

In a separate development, the capture last June of two suspects in the killing of three scientists who stumbled upon a cocaine laboratory in the Huanchaca area in September 1986 revived controversy over alleged DEA involvement in drug trafficking, embroiling the U.S. Embassy in another heated debate. Statements made by then-U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Robert Gelbard, that directly contradicted official U.S. Embassy statements made in October 1986 served to confuse matters even further, as did the U.S. Embassy's attempts to discredit a former Bolivian congressman involved in the 1986 investigation of the Huanchaca killings.

The months of May and June 1991 also witnessed widespread protests in the Chapare coca growing region of Bolivia in opposition to the army's involvement in antinarcotics operations and the government's failure to implement effective alternative development programs. Police and military troops were called out to dismantle roadblocks and disperse matches, resulting in hundreds arrested, scores wounded and one dead. The confrontations in the Chapare vividly illustrate the social and political tensions generated by the "war on drugs." By bringing in the army, the government appears to have sparked terrorist violence as well: following the April decision, bombs were reportedly found in several government buildings, the U.S. Embassy, the American Airlines office and in the La Paz airport. (3)

Although these recent controversies and confrontations have cooled down, the issues behind the debate on the antinarcotics strategy are far from resolved. As Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), noted in the July 1991 nomination hearing for Charles Bowers to replace Gelbard as U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, many analysts fear that the military component of U.S. drug policy may be doing more harm than good in that country. (4) Senator Alan Cranston pointed out that: His (Bowers) appearance before the Committee comes at a time of increasing strains in the U.S.-Bolivian relationship. It also comes at a time that those of us who have warned about the potential dangers of the Administration's antinarcotics strategy are, sadly, being proven right by developments in Bolivia. (5)

Resentment over what is viewed as a U.S.-driven policy has generated distrust and suspicion of the U.S. government by Bolivians across the political spectrum. As a result, debate revolves around issues of national sovereignty and U.S. interventionism, rather than the negative impact of drug trafficking on Bolivian society and the dire poverty that draws Bolivians into coca production. The U.S. government's insistence on involving the Bolivian army in antinarcotics operations frustrates and concerns Bolivians who remember well the rampant corruption and brutal human rights violations under the military "narco-dictatorship" of army general Luis Garcia Meza (1980-81). Bolivian analysts and politicians point out that a bigger threat to the country's civilian elected government may not be violent drug traffickers, but rather an antinarcotics policy that pushes the armed forces back into civilian affairs. While policymakers in Washington may think the potential gains outweigh the risks involved, the fundamental flaws in the policy assure failure. In fact, DEA officials reported a 28 percent increase in South American cocaine production in 1990. (6)

Bolivian analysts and politicians point out that a bigger threat to the country's civilian elected government may not be violent drug traffickers, but rather antinarcotics policy that pushes the armed forces back into civilian affairs.

The "Militarization" Debate

In September 1989, the Bush Administration launched the "Andean Strategy," a five-year program designed to reduce cocaine supply in the United States by 60 percent by 1999. The strategy does include significant amounts of economic assistance, primarily in the form of balance of payments support, for Andean countries that are deemed to be carrying out effective antinarcotics activities. The Andean governments themselves have emphasized the need for overall economic support. The U.S. strategy also institutionalizes the military component of U.S. international drug policy: it calls for the involvement of Andean militaries in antinarcotics operations; includes a dramatic increase in military and police assistance to Bolivia, Colombia and Peru; and prescribes a training and planning role for U.S. Special Forces. (7)

It is the latter - the part assigned to the Bolivian armed forces, particularly the army, and the role of the United States in planning and overseeing antinarcotics operations - that are the most controversial aspects of U.S. drug policy in Bolivia. The U.S. government claims that Bolivian army involvement is necessary to confront the Colombian drug traffickers that have displaced operations to Bolivia as a result of the "success" of antinarcotics efforts by the Colombian government. (The irony of defining "success" in this way for a multinational enterprise is not lost on Bolivians.) Indeed, drug trafficking operations have expanded in Bolivia and other countries as a result of the Colombian government's efforts to dismantle the Medellin cartel, posing a greater threat to the Bolivian government than before.

U.S. officials also note that they are responding to Bolivian military concerns that the antinarcotics police, the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), has become the best armed and trained force in the country. The U.S. government argues that aid to the military must be provided to balance the strength now possessed by the UMOPAR, which was set up in 1983 with funding provided by the U.S. government. The "Leopards," as the UMOPAR was originally called, staged an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1984.

According to the strategy laid out by U.S. officials, the Bolivian army is to provide the "logistical support" necessary for the UMOPAR to carry out its work more effectively. The term "logistical" appears to be loosely interpreted. Last year Ambassador Gelbard stated: U.S.-trained Bolivian army battalions would engage in special operations with or without police units. The procedure would be to secure the town or area (probably by the army) and to have house to house searches (probably by the police). Such a plan would likely entail military occupation of a town or region. (8)

More recent statements describe the army's role as backing up police forces in large-scale antinarcotics operations and providing transportation and communications support when needed. To facilitate the army's involvement in antinarcotics operations, the U.S. government is providing military aid and training to Bolivian troops. The details of this assistance are laid out in "Annex III," signed in May 1990 to supplement previous U.S.-Bolivian antinarcotics agreements. Annex III includes the supply of helicopter and airplane parts, six new UH-IH helicopters, maintenance and repairs for the entire air fleet of the Bolivian air force, and eight river patrol boats for the navy. Both the air force and navy had received previous U.S. support. But, for the first time, the annex outlined antinarcotics aid for the Bolivian army, including training and equipment for two infantry battalions to conduct antinarcotics operations. The annex also calls for aid and training for two engineering battalions to conduct civic action programs, and for a transportation battalion and a supply and service unit.

Although the bulk of the aid has yet to be delivered, Bolivia is slated to receive $47.5 million in military aid allocated for Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 and another $35.9 million allocated for FY1991, in addition to approximately $30 million in antinarcotics police assistance for the two-year period. Since Bolivia's total defense budget is approximately US$112 million, U.S. aid represents about a 32 percent increase in military resources. (9)

U.S. Special Forces have been training UMOPAR police troops as part of "Operation Snowcap," the DEA's ongoing program in the Andes which was initiated in 1987; however, training of the Bolivian army is just now getting off the ground with "Operation White Spear." An estimated 1,000 Bolivian army troops are participating in two 10-week sessions, in April and September of this year. Fifty-six U.S. Special Forces troops are involved in each round of training. According to British journalist James Painter, "The idea is to train the Bolivian troops in high-mobility ground operations, such as patrolling and ambushes, but nothing specific to the anti-drug war." He quotes the U.S. major in charge of the training operation as noting, "It's the same basic instruction as a U.S. light infantry battalion would receive - only in a shorter time." (10)

The U.S. may also assist in the construction of a base for Bolivian security forces engaged in antinarcotics operations. In a November 1989 interview, Ambassador Gelbard stated that the United States would finance the construction of a base on land owned by the Bolivian government, along the lines of the Santa Lucia base in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley."(11) Based on an interview with Ambassador Gelbard in September of that year, Jaime Malamud-Goti, an Argentine academic who was Senior Presidential Adviser on Human Rights and Drug Policy to the Alfonsin government, describes the base as "a new intelligence center in the Beni region of the Amazon," which would enhance the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Bolivian security forces to facilitate actions against large cocaine laboratories and airfields. (12)

Although U.S. officials deny that the United States has the upper hand in planning and overseeing antinarcotics activities, they argue that widespread corruption in the Bolivian government makes secrecy necessary in antinarcotics operations.

The U.S. government's drug plan calls for the U.S. military to provide much of the intelligence and strategic planning for the antinarcotics operations carried out by UMOPAR with the support of the Bolivian armed forces. (13) Although their current "rules of engagement" technically bar U.S. Special Forces from accompanying Bolivian troops on antinarcotics operations, U.S. DEA agents directly participate in UMOPAR actions. Their role, however, appears to be prescribed by their U.S. military counterparts. A DEA agent based in Bolivia complained that U.S. military personnel plan all antinarcotics operations out of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz, with little if no input from the DEA. (14)

Widespread Opposition to U.S. policy

The predominance of the U.S. role in gathering and analyzing intelligence and in planning operations and its insistence that the Bolivian army play a role in antinarcotics operations has provoked concern among Bolivian officials and has generated a nationalist backlash among the local population. Although U.S. officials deny that the United States has the upper hand in planning and overseeing antinarcotics activities, they argue that widespread corruption in the Bolivian government makes secrecy necessary in antinarcotics operations. Bolivian government officials have complained (off-the-record) of not being informed of antinarcotics operations until after they take place. Some officials also point out that instead of developing the Bolivian government's capacity to carry out effective antinarcotics programs, the United States centralizes information and control in its own hands, thereby creating a dependency on U.S. involvement.

Opposition to U.S. drug policy spans the political spectrum. In the April 4, 1991 vote regarding the authorization to allow U.S. military trainers into the country, left-leaning political forces were joined by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the leading conservative opposition party. Despite its image as the party most closely aligned with the U.S. government and its faithful implementation of U.S. drug policy when it last held the presidency (1985-89), the MNR joined other representatives in walking out of the Congress in protest of "militarization." According to MNR Congressman Raul Lema Patino, his party opposes the use of the Bolivian army in antinarcotics operations because it will lead to violence. (15)

Despite its image as the party most closely aligned with the U.S. government and its faithful implementation of U.S. drug policy when it last held the presidency (1985-89), the MNR joined other representatives in walking out of the Congress in protest of "militarization."

Just prior to the Congressional debate, former President and head of the MNR, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, referred to the debate over U.S. antinarcotics training for the military as "a moment of immense dependency and even embarrassment for the country." (16) The generally conservative Bolivian press was highly critical of the Bolivian government's acceptance of the U.S. trainers. Siglo 21 editorialized: "The U.S. Embassy's pressures on the Bolivian government have left a feeling of bitterness, of weakness, of dependency that has been reflected in the press and in public opinion." (17)

The Catholic Church expressed similar concerns and has been critical of moves toward militarization in general. Following a five-day meeting in Cochabamba last May, the Bolivian Episcopal Conference released a document warning against the use of military force to suppress drug trafficking because of the spiral of violence that it could engender.

Peasant and labor unions and progressive political parties, such as the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), are outspoken critics of U.S. policy and what is viewed as U.S. intervention in Bolivian affairs. For example, in a widely reported speech last June, Filemon Escobar, a well-known labor leader and United Left Congressman, denounced the U.S. government's imposition of unpopular policies, including militarization of the drug fight. (18)

The Bolivian Workers' Central (COB) - the country's main worker's federation - has repeatedly denounced militarization and the U.S. role. COB leader Carlos Camargo stated, "The (U.S.) Embassy, through its pressure and increasingly notorious intervention in the internal affairs and decisions of our country, is destabilizing the government." (19)

The Bolivian Government's Predicament

Many Bolivians feel that their government has capitulated under pressure to U.S. demands. The Jaime Paz Zamora government resisted signing Annex III, the 1990 military aid agreement with the United States, but backed down when the U.S. government threatened to withhold all economic assistance. (20) The Bush administration has effectively utilized U.S. legislation which conditions U.S. economic assistance and support in international financial institutions on "cooperation" with antinarcotics programs to gain Bolivian military participation in the drug war. However, "cooperation" is loosely defined in the U.S. law, which does not specify military collaboration. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Paz Zamora was not willing to jeopardize his free-market economic program - which is dependent on both U.S. foreign aid and U.S. support in the international financial community. But just before signing Annex III in May 1990, Paz Zamora was quoted in the Bolivian press as stating that there was no need to involve the military in the drug war because the police were doing a good job, and that involvement of the armed forces would only cause unnecessary violence. Once the agreement was signed, Bolivian navy and air force participation in antinarcotics activities was expanded. However, Paz Zamora continued to resist U.S. pressure to involve the Bolivian army directly, at one point claiming that U.S. military assistance would be used to form "environmental brigades." In September 1990, Christopher Marquis of The Miami Herald reported: "Under the plan approved by Paz, the U.S. aid would pay for the deployment of lightly armed troops in remote, ecologically sensitive regions to enforce laws against deforestation and river pollution, Bolivian officials said." (21)

According to official sources, in January 1991 the Bolivian government finally made a verbal agreement with U.S. officials to initiate army involvement in antinarcotics activities. In late March the Bolivian government publicly admitted that U.S. training activities with the Bolivian army were about to get underway and asked for congressional approval for the presence of the U.S. military trainers. (22) Despite the fact that Congress is controlled by the coalition in control of the executive branch, the legislature's assent was presumably sought to increase the perceived legitimacy of the training operation.

Although Bolivians are well aware of the U.S. pressure exerted on President Paz Zamora, he has been widely criticized for misinforming the public about negotiations and agreements with the U.S. government and for not incorporating broader sectors of Bolivian society into the policy making process.

According to Bolivian journalist and politician Roger Cortez, President Paz Zamora finally agreed to move ahead with the implementation of Annex III as a result of pressure exerted by the U.S. government. The United States gained leverage in the negotiations as a result of a substantial amount of evidence that it reportedly accumulated implicating high-level Bolivian government officials in drug trafficking. (23) U.S. accusations of corruption ultimately led to the resignations of the Interior Minister, Guillermo Capobianco, and police commander Felipe Carvajal in mid-March 1991. Both maintained their innocence, claiming that they were forced to resign to protect the "image of the nation." (24) Another factor weighing on the government may have been pressure from certain sectors of the Bolivian army for additional resources. As noted previously, the army was until recently the only ! institution among the nation's security forces not receiving U.S. antinarcotics assistance.

The Bolivian government's reluctance to bring the army into antinarcotics activities is well-founded. The army's involvement in the country's internal political affairs is long-standing: Bolivia has had 188 military governments in 166 years of independence.

The U.S. government has also been pressing the Bolivian government to sign an extradition treaty, which would expand existing agreements and ostensibly further cooperation in antinarcotics activities. The Bolivian government claims that a treaty is not needed, as it has signed the Vienna Convention, which incorporates extradition. Bolivian officials also note that an agreement signed in 1900 to allow the extradition of the outlaw Butch Cassidy, who was hiding out in Bolivia, is still applicable. Opposition to a new extradition treaty has been clearly articulated in the Bolivian Congress and in the local press.

On July 29, 1991 the Bolivian government announced a Colombia-style policy by which any trafficker who turned himself in and confessed within the following four months could not be extradited to the United States. The terms of the arrangement, however, are tougher than those posed by Colombia: those who surrender must acknowledge their crimes, provide a list of accomplices and turn over all personal assets derived from the illicit drug trade. Nonetheless, U.S. officials have shown little enthusiasm for the measure, expressing doubts as to the ability of the Bolivian judiciary to prosecute and sentence drug traffickers. (25) The Bolivian army, on the other hand, has reacted favorably, perhaps taking advantage of an opportunity to bow out of the drug war gracefully. According to press reports, the commander of the Bolivian army, General Guido Sandoval, stated that if drug traffickers turn themselves in "there is no reason for the army to participate in the fight against drug trafficking." (26) To date, four traffickers have taken advantage of the government's offer: Erwin Guzman Gonzales, Winston Rodriguez, Antonio Naciff and Hugo Rivero Villavicencio, all of whom are wanted in the United States on drug charges.

Lack of Public Accountability

Although Bolivians are well aware of the U.S. pressure exerted on President Paz Zamora, he has been widely criticized for misinforming the public about negotiations and agreements with the U.S. government and for not incorporating broader sectors of Bolivian society into the policy making process. Just after signing the military aid agreement with the U.S. government in May 1990, for example, Paz Zamora stated, "Under no circumstances will we permit a militarization of the struggle against drug trafficking." (27) The Bolivian government did not admit to having signed the military aid agreement with the United States until MBL leader Antonio Aranibar Quiroga returned from Washington with a copy of it, which was released to the press. In March 1991, the Paz Zamora government denied that plans were underway to begin U.S. training of Bolivian army troops, although this information had been publicly stated by U.S. officials.

Information which is public in Washington is often kept from the public in Bolivia. A widely-respected Bolivian analyst, Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, notes that in interviews carried out between 1988 and 1990, Bolivian government officials denied the existence of the DEA's Operation Snowcap at the same time that "the U.S. Congress was holding public hearings on the effectiveness of the operation." (28) Gamarra concludes that to a large degree, "the Andean Strategy has been negotiated and implemented only with the knowledge of a few members of the ruling parties." (29)

The Legacy of the 1980-81 "Narco-Dictatorship"

The Bolivian government's reluctance to bring the army into antinarcotics activities is well-founded. The army's involvement in the country's internal political affairs is long-standing: Bolivia has had 188 military governments in 166 years of independence. Although the country will celebrate its ninth anniversary of civilian rule in October 1991, there is a delicate balance between civilian and military power which could be easily upset by antinarcotics operations that reassert military predominance in maintaining domestic order. The tenuous foothold of the civilian government is evident in its inability to assert its constitutional authority to administer justice. Efforts to bring Gen. Garcia Meza to trial for crimes committed during his 1980-81 rule have foundered, and he reportedly moves about freely in Bolivia and continues to receive his military pension. (30) According to Bolivian analyst Raul Barrios, "Increasing the military's potential in Bolivia is a serious matter. By augmenting its autonomy, the United States may very well be breaking down the military's subordination to civilian powers." (31) The cocaine trade became firmly established in Bolivia during the rule of General Hugo Banzer Suarez (1971-78), and flourished during General Garcia Meza's "narco-dictatorship" of 1980-81. Under Garcia Meza's rule, drug trafficking was consolidated under military officials in high-ranking government posts. The dictator established a tightly-controlled, hierarchical operation that, like the Colombian drug cartels, integrated the cocaine production process from buying coca leaves to transporting cocaine to the United States and Europe. Cocaine laboratories proliferated, and the drug trade boomed. In response the U.S. government cut off aid to the Bolivian dictatorship. Aid was resumed with the return to civilian rule - but the legacy of extensive military corruption and the use of state power to protect and expand drug trafficking operations and profits remains alive in Bolivia.

A development worker from Cochabamba noted on a recent trip to Washington that "to bring in the army would be the best way to promote drug trafficking in Bolivia."

In fact, many prominent members of the de facto Garcia Meza government have worked their way back into positions of power. The notorious Minister of the Interior, Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, is behind bars in the United States, sentenced to thirty years in jail on drug trafficking charges. But Bolivia's newly appointed Minister of Defense, Rear Admiral Alberto Saenz Klinsky, was also a minister during Garcia Meza's rule. Some high-level military officials protested President Paz Zamora's August appointment of Saenz Klinsky, and army commander General Jorge Moreira resigned - in both cases not because of the Garcia Meza connection, but because of the "subordinate" rank of the new defense minister. (32) As a result of the Bolivian military's history of involvement in the cocaine trade, many Bolivians are astounded by U.S. insistence that the armed forces be integrated into antinarcotics programs. A development worker from Cochabamba noted on a recent trip to Washington that "to bring in the army would be the best way to promote drug trafficking in Bolivia." (33) In response to these criticisms, U.S. officials claim that with the proper training and support from the U.S. government, corruption can be significantly reduced. However, the history of U.S. antinarcotics programs in Bolivia - as elsewhere - illustrates the difficulty of significantly reducing corruption. As a result, the forces trained by the United States are continually lost to collusion with traffickers. Although the UMOPAR won high praise from the U.S. Embassy in La Paz for its antinarcotics operations conducted this year, it was necessary as recently as last May to reassign or dismiss dozens of top officials for suspected corruption. Bolivian army officials maintain that fear of corruption is behind its reluctance to get involved in antinarcotics operations. (34) The prevalence of police and armed forces collaboration with drug traffickers has been widely documented by the national and international press.

"Bolivia's weak democratic traditions may not survive a U.S. policy which rebuilds the military, pushes for militarized zones, and thrusts the armed forces of the region into conflicts with peasants and other groups opposed to counternarcotics operations," according to Eduardo Gamarra.

Bolivians also express concern that army involvement in antinarcotics activities unnecessarily provokes the local population and is likely to lead to widespread abuses and violence. As described below, violent confrontations between the UMOPAR and Bolivians living in the Chapare are already common, and raids on towns in the Beni region, where many cocaine laboratories are located, inevitably result in accusations of mistreatment by UMOPAR and DEA agents. Bringing in the military, which has a history of violent conflict with labor and peasant groups, is only likely to exacerbate such tensions and could initiate a vicious spiral of violence that until now has not existed in Bolivia, as it has in neighboring Peru and Colombia. "Bolivia's weak democratic traditions may not survive a U.S. policy which rebuilds the military, pushes for militarized zones, and thrusts the armed forces of the region into conflicts with peasants and other groups opposed to counternarcotics operations," according to Eduardo Gamarra. (35) From a Bolivian point of view, the medicine prescribed by the U.S. government may be worse than the disease.

Coca vs. Cocaine

Perhaps the greatest potential for confrontations between the military and civil society can be found in the Chapare region, where coca leaves are grown. Over the last decade, thousands of Bolivians have migrated to the Chapare seeking employment. Attempting to eke out a living in South America's poorest country, coca growers have become an important social and political force in Bolivia and are represented in well-organized federations. The Bolivian government is faced with the difficult challenge of responding to the economic reality which drives the poor into coca production, while at the same time combating the cocaine industry, which utilizes the bulk of the Bolivian coca crop. The coca leaf, which is mixed with chemicals to make cocaine, is a traditional Andean crop. The world demand for cocaine has transformed coca into Bolivia's number one export crop. In addition to its religious and cultural significance for Andean peasants, chewing the coca leaf wards off hunger and fatigue, thereby making extreme poverty and the harsh climatic conditions of the highlands more bearable. The coca leaf, which has been legally grown in the Andes for centuries, should not be confused with cocaine, a chemically processed derivative.

"In reality, coca is the only alternative for me," claimed one producer. "I cannot get bananas to the market, even if I could get a better price for them. How else can I feed my family?"

Coca production has spread from the Andean highlands to the Chapare region - located in the central lowlands - where it has expanded at a dramatic rate. By conservative estimates approximately 80,000 hectares of coca are cultivated in Bolivia, which is second only to Peru in world production. This boom is a direct response to international demand for cocaine. It is also a response to economic crisis and extreme poverty. The number of coca farmers tripled between 1980 and 1986 - when the Bolivian economy went through an extraordinary cycle of inflation and then deep recession. For thousands of Bolivians, growing coca is their only economic alternative. They face over 20 percent unemployment and steadily declining living standards in rural areas due to harsh economic austerity programs. (36)

An estimated 75,000 families - or 300,000 Bolivians - in the Chapare are involved in coca production, which in turn is estimated to have generated another 175,000 jobs. (37) If the coca boom ended in Bolivia, which has a total population of under 7 million, the ranks of the unemployed would swell dramatically. Coca production, however, allows only a subsistence level living. Price fluctuations make it a risky business, occasionally creating economic losses when the market price falls below the production cost. Most of the time, coca production lets a family eat - bananas, yuca and rice - and not much more. Although the coca crop of the Chapare provides an estimated $600 million in foreign exchange - equal in value to all other exports combined - the region lacks basic services and infrastructure. Health care is a rare commodity, as are running water, paved roads and electricity. The lack of infrastructure encourages coca production. Local residents have the option of transporting coca leaves on bicycles or on their backs to local markets where the product is sold to middlemen, or lugging pounds of bananas on their backs to markets which are often farther away. Despite price fluctuations, coca yields a much higher profit margin than other crops grown in the area and it produces four yearly harvests. "In reality, coca is the only alternative for me," claimed one producer. "I cannot get bananas to the market, even if I could get a better price for them. How else can I feed my family?" (38)

Coca growers in the Chapare adamantly defend their right to grow coca to survive and defend the coca leaf as an important religious, cultural and medicinal product. However, they are not opposed to substituting their coca fields for economically viable alternative crops. As noted above, overproduction and antinarcotics activities cause the price of the coca leaf to fluctuate, and a stable income is not assured. (39) Coca growers run the risk of having their crops destroyed and their personal property stolen or damaged during the frequent raids by UMOPAR troops. Illegal searches and seizures are frequent in the Chapare.

Yet to date no viable alternatives to coca exist for the region. The Bolivian government's efforts to promote alternative crops have been hampered by lack of funds, political conflicts within the bureaucracy, and difficulties in working with the organized federations in the area. The coca growers complain that the government rarely fulfills agreements on resource allocations and development programs for the region. Moreover, the government's macroeconomic policies and trade liberalization have created unfavorable conditions for agricultural production by small farmers, thereby generating even greater disincentives for crop substitution. According to the president of the Colonizers' Federation of the Tropical Carrasco, Valentin Gutierrez, "We've heard so many promises that have never been fulfilled. For us, coca eradication without development means hunger and misery. Many who have eradicated have returned to their places of origin, but they can't survive there either" (40)

The coca growers mediate their demands with the government through federations, which have steadily grown in size and influence. The five federations in the Chapare, which were founded in the 1960s as colonizers' unions, collect and present grievances to local and national governments. They have come to represent an important pressure group - both within the labor movement and at a broader political level - that cannot be ignored.

The coca growers mediate their demands with the government through federations, which have steadily grown in size and influence.

Because local governments are weak and ineffective, the federations have taken on some important local functions. Dr. Kevin Healy notes: "They have the authority, legitimacy, and power to establish private land boundaries for new colonists, to influence transport fares, and to manage and tax coca-leaf markets in the towns of the Chapare, with the funds so raised to be used for local, small-scale public works programs." (41) The federations collect "taxes" which are used to build local markets and to repair the roads blown up by the UMOPAR and the DEA. This is a common practice, which aims to disrupt the transportation of coca paste out of the Chapare, but which prevents other crops from being marketed as well.

Confrontations in the Chapare

As the voice of the local population, the federations have been outspoken critics of the government's eradication-oriented antinarcotics efforts and of the role of the Bolivian army and U.S. trainers in those activities. To that end, the coca growers federations - often supported by the other major peasant and labor unions - have organized marches and road blocks to protest what they see as "repressive" antinarcotics activities and to demand attention to their economic plight. In the past, bloody confrontations have resulted from police and military attempts to repress these forms of social protest. On May 27, 1987 five peasants were reportedly killed by UMOPAR troops in Parotani, Cochambamba. In a widely-reported incident on June 27, 1989, UMOPAR troops opened fire on a crowd protesting outside its headquarters in Villa Tunari. An estimated twelve persons were killed in the stampede away from the gunfire. Many others were injured and arrested.

Although government officials insist that there are no plans for the army to enter the Chapare, occasional statements by army officers of the need to "reestablish military control" in the area fuel concerns.

The decision by the Bolivian government to allow the army to get involved in the antinarcotics programs sparked further protest, as local residents fear that this will provide the military with an excuse to establish a permanent presence in the Chapare. Although government officials insist that there are no plans for the army to enter the Chapare, occasional statements by army officers of the need to "reestablish military control" in the area fuel concerns. Moreover, U.S. "drug czar" Robert Martinez reportedly spoke publicly of the need for the army to operate against drug traffickers in the Chapare during a recent visit to the zone. North American journalist Leslie Wirpsa points out:

The Bolivian government has promised that the troops will not pursue peasants who grow coca, nor will they rout out coca plants. They will only target 'drug traffickers,' the government says. Peasants, however, fear the lines will blur between big chiefs of the narcotics trade, peasants who make cocaine base or paste in jungle 'kitchens' and those who legally cultivate coca leaf. They fear renewed repression from an army known for its brutality during de facto military regimes of the 1970s. (42) In response, representatives at the First Annual Meeting of Andean Coca Growers, held in La Paz last March, pledged to form self-defense groups to protect themselves against potential aggression from the army and against on-going aggression by the UMOPAR. (43) Political tensions are high, creating the conditions from which violence easily erupts. Anti-American sentiment is high as well. During a protest march through the streets of Cochabamba in mid-May, hundreds of members of coca growers associations shouted, "Life to coca! Death to the gringos!" (44) The marches were scheduled to resume in the middle of June, and on June 17, roadblocks were set up. Once again, the military was called in to stop the protest. According to Informe R, military and police troops impeded the roadblocks and other forms of protest. More than 200 local leaders were arrested and the government suspended talks with the coca growers federations that began in May. (45) The protests were supported by the two leading opposition political parties. MNR Congressman Guillermo Richter stated, "The MNR believes the government has committed an error in suspending the dialogue with the peasants and by using the armed forces and the police to control the roadblocks...it is not correct to use military force to resolve conflicts because this will generate confrontations..." Congressman Alfonso Alem also voiced support on behalf of the MBL, declaring that the protest was justified by the government's repeated failure to comply with agreements made with the coca growers and other political forces. (46)

A subsequent demonstration was declared for the anniversary of the Villa Tunari killings on June 27, in which 8,000 peasants were reported to have participated. A march for "Dignity and Sovereignty" was scheduled for June 30, but Bolivian troops again forced the protectors to disband. One person was killed, scores were wounded, and two key federation leaders - Evo Morales and Hilaridn Mamani - were temporarily detained.

Following months of violent confrontations and stalled negotiations, an agreement between the government and the coca growers was finally signed in early July. In it, the coca growers agree to cooperate with antinarcotics activities; the government agreed that the armed forces will not be involved in operations against coca growers and again promised to implement effective alternative development programs. The agreement also calls for the formation of a commission composed of government officials, church leaders, journalists and coca growers to investigate and respond to cases of UMOPAR abuses against coca growers. Whether both parties to the agreement will act to implement it, or whether it will remain on paper only - as has so often happened in the past - remains to be seen.

The Cochabamba branch of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, one of Bolivia's leading human rights organizations, regularly denounces human rights violations committed by antinarcotics police in the Chapare, including torture and illegal detentions.

The abuses referred to in the agreement are widespread. In addition to short-term detentions and mistreatment and occasional killings as a result of social protest and the illegal searches and seizures documented above, local residents claim that arbitrary arrests and torture by the UMOPAR are a common occurrence. Although extensive documentation of such human rights violations is hard to come by given the remoteness of the Chapare, personal testimonies abound. The Catholic church and Bolivian human rights groups have collected individual testimonies and generally support the concerns of both the coca growers and residents of the Beni region. The Cochabamba branch of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, one of Bolivia's leading human rights organizations, regularly denounces human rights violations committed by antinarcotics police in the Chapare, including torture and illegal detentions. As pointed out by local leader Valentin Gutierrez: We have suffered repeated abuses at the hands of the anti-drug police - stealing our things, breaking into our homes in the middle of the night, beating us up. We believe the military will only be worse. (47)

More often than not, local residents implicate the DEA in these abuses. Although no further evidence exists to verify these claims, the presence of DEA agents at raids when abuses occur tarnish the agency's image and create the impression that it condones such behavior. As long as the UMOPAR continues to mistreat Bolivian citizens while accompanied by DEA agents, local residents will point the finger at the DEA, accusing them of abuses as well.